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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether fiscal fatigue is a robust characteristic of the fiscal reaction function in 
a panel of OECD countries over the period 1970-2014 or merely an artifact of ignoring important 
aspects of the panel dimension of the data. More specifically, we test whether the quadratic and cubic 
debt-to-GDP terms remain significant once dynamics, heterogeneous slopes and an asymmetric 
reaction to the business cycle are allowed for. The results show a significant heterogeneous reaction 
of the primary balance to lagged debt with fiscal fatigue not being a general characteristic of the fiscal 
reaction function shared by all countries in our panel. In line with the literature, we further find that 
fiscal balances tend to deteriorate in contractions without correspondingly improving during 
expansions. Explorative stochastic debt simulations show that debt forecasts crucially depend on the 
specification of the fiscal reaction function. 
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1 Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis, rising age-related public expenditures and the secular stagnation
of output growth have put renewed emphasis on questions about the sustainability of fiscal policy.
In a series of papers, Bohn (1995, 1998) developed a stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate
the sustainability question. He argues that plausible indicators such as the average budget deficit
and the realized path of the debt-to-GDP ratio can be quite misleading as fiscal sustainability also
depends on future economic growth and interest rates. Although historically a growth dividend
has covered the entire interest bill on U.S. debt, neither a stable debt-to-GDP ratio nor a balanced
primary budget (i.e. the overall government budget net of interest payments on debt) guaranties
sustainability when there is a positive probability that future economic growth falls below the
interest rate. He further shows that a positive reaction of the primary budget to lagged debt, in
contrast, is a sufficient condition for the government to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint
and hence fiscal policy to be sustainable. The essence of Bohn’s sustainability test is to estimate
a fiscal reaction function (FRF) to determine whether a build-up of the public debt-to-GDP ratio
elicits an increase in the primary balance, controlling for other determinants (the business cycle,
inflation, external deficits, etc.). Based on FRF estimates, Bohn (1998) concludes that U.S. fiscal
policy has historically been sustainable. Mendoza and Ostry (2008) extend this evidence of fiscal
solvency to a large panel of developed and emerging economies.
Contemporary debt sustainability analysis has evolved from estimating FRFs to using these
estimates for stochastic debt simulations. To this end, a reduced form vector autoregressive (VAR)
model is estimated to obtain the joint distribution of shocks to a standard set of macroeconomic
variables (e.g. output growth, real interest rates and inflation) affecting debt dynamics. Repeatedly
drawing shocks from this distribution, letting the primary balance react through the FRF and
calculating the implied change in debt then generates stochastic debt trajectories, which are typically
summarized by plotting fan charts (see e.g. Celasun et al., 2007; Medeiros, 2012).
With the FRF at the center of debt sustainability analysis, it is essential that it is correctly
specified and estimated. A first key question is whether the FRF is linear or non-linear in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. The most simple rule that ensures sustainability is a linear one. However, in
an attempt to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at a reasonable level, fiscal policy may respond more
when debt is high and/or rising while being less responsive at lower debt levels. Bohn (1998) indeed
shows that U.S. fiscal policy over the period 1916-1995 was unresponsive at low levels of debt but
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significantly active at higher levels. Ghosh et al. (2013) further argue that it cannot literally be
true that the primary balance would always increase with debt because, at sufficiently high levels of
debt, this would require primary balances that exceed GDP. Using a panel of 23 advanced countries
over the period 1970-2007, they find strong support for the existence of a non-linear FRF that
exhibits this alleged ‘fiscal fatigue’ characteristic. Specifically, the FRF is well approximated by a
cubic function where at low levels of debt there is no relationship between the primary balance and
debt while as debt rises, the primary balance increases but the responsiveness eventually weakens
and then actually decreases at very high levels of debt. This implies that there is a debt level above
which the debt dynamics become explosive and the government will necessarily default. A similar
result can be found in Mendoza and Ostry (2008) and Ostry et al. (2010) and is now widely accepted
as an important characteristic of FRFs and used by different policy institutions to calculate fiscal
space, as the difference between this debt limit and the observed debt-to-GDP ratio, or embedded
in their stochastic debt simulations (see e.g. Fournier and Fall, 2015; Berti et al., 2016).
A second important topic is the dynamic specification of the FRF. The highly politicized nature
of government budgeting makes it hard to react immediately to changes in debt and other economic
conditions. As a result, the primary balance turns out to be a highly persistent series. Ghosh
et al. (2013) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) both consider a static FRF, though, dealing with the
resulting strong autocorrelation in the error terms using a somewhat mechanical Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) correction. In fact, the underlying assumption of an autoregressive (AR) pattern
in the error terms implies that the persistence in the primary balance is assumed to stem from
autocorrelation in exogenous shocks that hit the primary balance. This precludes a slow reaction
in response to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio or other economic conditions and potential non-
linearities induced by fiscal plans. Although there are plenty of studies that model slow adjustment
by adding the lagged primary balance as an explanatory variable (see e.g. E´gert, 2012; Fata´s and
Mihov, 2012, for recent work), studies combining a dynamic model with non-linearities are rare.
One exception is Ostry et al. (2010) who combine a dynamic specification with a non-linear (cubic)
reaction in the debt-GDP ratio as a robustness test in their appendix.
A third specification issue is potential slope heterogeneity. Because debt-to-GDP ratios often
show only small variation over time within countries, most of the current literature estimating
FRFs relies on panel datasets. Adding a cross-sectional dimension and using a homogeneous panel
specification ensures that there is sufficient information in debt-to-GDP ratios - ranging from low
levels in countries like Australia, New-Zealand, Denmark, Norway and Sweden to very high levels
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in countries like Belgium, Greece, Italy and Japan - to identify non-linearities in the FRF. However,
the significant fiscal fatigue identified by e.g. Ghosh et al. (2013) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008)
may very well be induced by slope heterogeneity. If some countries react weaker to debt than others
(i.e. they have a smaller coefficient on the debt-to-GDP ratio in their FRF), these countries will
over time end up with a higher debt level. When estimating a homogeneous FRF, high debt will
coincide with a weak reaction in the primary balance not because of fiscal fatigue but because of
unmodeled slope heterogeneity in the FRF across countries.
A further specification matter is that an adequate analysis of debt sustainability requires an
appropriate modeling of the link between fiscal policy and the business cycle. There is quite some
literature on this complex link, but it is somewhat detached from the literature on debt sustainabil-
ity. Gali and Perotti (2003) and Fata´s and Mihov (2012) emphasize the role played by automatic
stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy. The degree of automatic stabilization depends on the size
of the government and the progressiveness of the tax system, implying that the automatic reac-
tion of fiscal policy to the business cycle is heterogeneous across countries. Large cross-sectional
variation in the use of discretionary policy further adds to this heterogeneity. Moreover, there is
growing evidence that fiscal variables react asymmetrically to cyclical conditions, i.e. fiscal balances
tend to deteriorate in contractions without correspondingly improving in expansions (E´gert, 2012;
Balassone et al., 2010). When this asymmetry is not taken into account, the risk of debt increases
may be underestimated (Celasun et al., 2007).
The objective of this paper is to design an appropriately specified panel FRF. More specifically,
we will investigate whether fiscal fatigue is a robust characteristic in a panel of OECD countries over
the period 1970-2014 or merely an artifact of ignoring important aspects of the panel dimension of
the data. Hence, we will test whether the quadratic and cubic debt-to-GDP terms remain significant
once dynamics are adequately modeled and heterogeneous slopes and an asymmetric reaction to the
business cycle are allowed for. The results show a significantly heterogeneous reaction of the primary
balance to lagged debt with fiscal fatigue not being a general characteristic of the FRF shared by
all countries in our panel. In line with the literature, we further find that fiscal balances tend
to deteriorate in contractions without correspondingly improving during expansions. Explorative
stochastic debt simulations show that debt forecasts crucially depend on the specification of the
FRF. Especially for some of the countries with relatively high debt levels, debt trajectories are more
favorable when based on a FRF figuring fiscal fatigue. This is due to the fact that our coefficient
estimates for the fiscal fatigue specification imply that the response of the primary balance is at
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its maximum when the debt-to-GDP ratio is around 100%, which may be much more favorable for
simulated debt trajectories than those based on the country-specific coefficient estimates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our empirical specification
and estimation methodology. Section 3 presents the estimation results. Section 4 illustrates to
what extent the specification of the fiscal reaction function influences the outcome of stochastic
debt simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical specification and estimation methodology
In this section we outline our empirical specification of the FRF and the econometric methodology
to estimate it. We start with the baseline specification as outlined in Ghosh et al. (2013) and next
extend it to allow for persistence in the primary balance, a heterogeneous response to lagged debt
and a heterogeneous and asymmetric reaction to the business cycle.
2.1 Baseline specification
Our starting point is the static homogeneous non-linear panel FRF proposed by Ghosh et al. (2013)
pbit = αi + β1di,t−1 + β2d2i,t−1 + β3d
3
i,t−1 + φgapit + Zitω + εit, (1)
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T and where pbit denotes the primary balance of country i in
period t, di,t−1 the one period lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and gapit the output gap. Following the
literature (see e.g. Gali and Perotti, 2003; Mendoza and Ostry, 2008; Ostry et al., 2010; Ghosh et al.,
2013), we add a vector of control variables Zit including inflation (infl it), the implicit interest rate
on government debt (iirit), the current account balance as a percentage of GDP (curacit), trade
openness (openit), the ratio of elderly (oldit), the future ratio of elderly (Foldit) and three dummy
variables capturing whether a country is part of the Euro area in a specific year (Deuroit ), whether
elections where held in a certain year (Delecit ) and whether a country adopted some type of fiscal rule
(Dfiscit ). Country-fixed effects αi are included to account for country-specific time-invariant factors
not included in Zit that affect the primary balance.
Since unmodeled persistence in the error terms of equation (1) would cause the lagged debt-to-
GDP ratio di,t−1 and its powers to be endogenous and hence induce inconsistency, εit is modeled as
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an AR(1) process
εit = ρεi,t−1 + µit. (2)
The model in equations (1)-(2) is typically estimated using the (iterated) Prais-Winsten Generalised
Least Squares (GLS) estimator (see e.g. Ostry et al., 2010; Ghosh et al., 2013).
As fiscal policy, and hence the primary balance pbit, is expected to have an impact on the state
of the economy, the output gap gapit is most likely an endogenous variable in equation (1). We
will therefore use an instrumental variables estimator using the first and the second lag of gapit
(in line with Gali and Perotti, 2003) and a (trade share) weighted average of foreign countries’
output gaps gapfit (in line with Pesaran et al., 2004; Jaimovich et al., 2007) as instruments. Both
instruments are expected to be correlated with the output gap while at the same time being pre-
determined/exogenous. Besides the output gap, also the current account and implicit interest rate
on government debt are potentially endogenous. The twin-deficit hypothesis states that a fiscal
deficit (due to e.g. a tax reduction) may lead to an income boost and hence a current account
deterioration. We instrument the current account and the implicit interest rate by their own first
and second lag.1
The fiscal fatigue proposition of a positive but eventually slowing response of the primary balance
to rising debt should show up as a β3 < 0 (in a cubic specification) or β2 < 0 and β3 = 0 (in a
quadratic specification). Using a panel of 23 advanced economies over the period 1970-2007, Ghosh
et al. (2013) find β1 < 0, β2 > 0 and β3 < 0. Their coefficient estimates imply that the marginal
response of the primary balance to lagged debt is at its maximum for a debt-to-GDP ratio of around
100% of GDP, starts to decline beyond that level and becomes negative for very high debt-to-GDP
ratios (exceeding 140%). As a result, the response of the primary balance is at its maximum for a
debt-to-GDP ratio of around 140%. However, Table 1 shows that this downward sloping segment
of the FRF is identified mainly from the behavior of Japan, and to a lesser extent Belgium and
Italy, as over the period 1970-2007 only these countries have episodes where the debt-to-GDP ratio
is well above 100%. Hence, it is not obvious that this empirical result can be generalized to fiscal
fatigue being present in all individual countries.
1The instruments were found to be sufficiently strong, with a first step adjusted R2 of 67.2, 83.3 and 98.7 for
the output gap, the current account and the implicit interest rate respectively. As each of these variables has strong
persistence, especially their first lag serves as a valuable instrument.
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Table 1: Evolution of debt-to-GDP ratio
70-79 80-89 90-99 00-07 08-14
Australia 25.6 21.2 26.5 13.4 23.8
Austria 23.0 47.9 62.5 64.5 71.1
Belgium 60.1 108.3 125.8 96.8 97.1
Canada 48.4 61.8 92.8 75.4 84.8
Denmark 8.4 53.8 67.6 42.6 41.5
Finland 6.1 14.7 45.1 41.6 49.3
France 17.8 28.6 49.7 62.1 85.1
Germany 22.7 38.9 51.3 64.1 77.5
Greece 24.8 41.6 90.7 103.2 149.2
Ireland 46.1 90.4 78.3 30.2 92.9
Italy 51.3 75.9 112.5 105.5 122.3
Japan 23.5 64.8 92.5 171.3 226.6
Korea 15.2 17.9 10.1 24.0 34.5
Netherlands 41.8 63.3 73.0 50.5 66.2
New Zealand 51.3 59.8 48.5 24.8 32.6
Norway 39.8 31.5 32.3 47.4 53.3
Portugal 20.8 47.6 54.3 57.7 104.3
Spain 13.3 25.2 55.0 47.6 71.2
Sweden 20.1 50.8 62.1 49.8 40.2
UK 55.3 48.0 45.0 40.8 77.2
US 44.0 52.6 67.7 59.2 94.9
Sources: see Table 5 in Appendix A.
2.2 Extended specification
To investigate the robustness of the fiscal fatigue proposition, we alter and extend the baseline
specification of the panel FRF in equation (1) to
pbit = αi + δt + γpbi,t−1 + β1idi,t−1 + β2id2i,t−1 + β3id
3
i,t−1 + φitgapit + Zitω + εit. (3)
By allowing the coefficient β1i to be heterogeneous across countries, equation (3) makes it possible
to discriminate between the fiscal fatigue proposition that the response of the primary balance
eventually decreases at high levels of debt (β3 < 0 or β2 < 0, β3 = 0) in all countries and the
proposition that the response to debt is heterogeneous (β1i is significantly different) across countries.
Adequately discriminating between these two propositions requires sufficiently rich data, i.e. the
panel should contain enough countries with considerable variation in their debt-to-GDP ratio over
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time. The recent sovereign debt crisis entails interesting new information in this respect as there
was a widespread increase in debt levels, with additional countries moving into the area where fiscal
fatigue may set in or moved from relatively low to high levels of debt. Table 1 shows that this was
especially the case for Ireland, Greece and Portugal and to a lesser extent for France, Spain, the UK
and the US. The sovereign debt crisis thus makes it possible to analyze the behavior of countries’
fiscal policy over a wider range of debt levels. We will further test whether there is a heterogeneous
non-linear reaction to lagged debt by also allowing β2i or β3i to differ across countries.
Our extended specification (3) nests three further generalizations. First, the use of an AR(1)
process for the error terms εit in equation (1) implies that persistence in the baseline specification
stems exclusively from autocorrelation in shocks hitting the primary balance. Hence, it disregards
the slow political process underlying budget formation. To allow for sluggishness in the response
of fiscal policy to economic conditions we add the lagged primary balance pbi,t−1 as an explanatory
variable to the model. The extension from a static to a dynamic panel data model may complicate
estimation. Dynamic panel data models with country fixed effects suffer from the well-known
Nickell (1981) bias for finite T and N → ∞. The current literature provides numerous methods
for avoiding this bias such as the difference and system generalized method of moment estimators
of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) or the bias-corrected fixed effects
estimators proposed by Kiviet (1995) or Everaert and Pozzi (2007). However, due to our sufficiently
long time dimension (T = 45 > 30), this bias is expected to be negligibly small (see Judson and
Owen, 1999). Experimenting with these alternative estimation methods (results not reported)
showed that this is indeed the case.
Second, global economic trends and common economic shocks (e.g. the recent financial crisis)
can cause cross-sectional dependence and are potentially also an additional source of persistence
in the error terms. We account for this by adding time-fixed effects δt to the model. We also
implemented the more general Common Correlated Effects estimator suggested by Pesaran (2006),
but given the fairly large number of explanatory variables too many degrees of freedom were lost (i.e.
up to 15 country-specific coefficients need to be estimated) to obtain accurate estimates. Moreover,
the results presented below show that the time-fixed effects are sufficient to remove the positive
cross-sectional dependence in the error terms.
Third, borrowing from the literature analyzing the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, we allow for
a flexible reaction to business cycle fluctuations by modeling φit as a parameter that can vary both
over countries and time. Heterogeneity over countries is added as both the degree of automatic
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stabilization and discretionary policy vary substantially internationally (Fata´s and Mihov, 2012).
Time variation in φit should capture the potential asymmetric reaction to positive and negative
cyclical conditions (E´gert et al., 2010). This can be modeled by letting φit take on two different
values, i.e. φi1 when the economy of country i is in a downturn (gapit < 0) and φi2 in case of an
upturn (gapit > 0). This allows for a different reaction of the primary balance towards the output
gap depending on the state of the economy.
3 Estimation results
Our dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of yearly data for 21 OECD countries over the period
1970-2014.2 A more detailed description of the included variables and the data sources used can be
found in Table 5 in Appendix A. We start with discussing the results for the baseline specification
and subsequently extend the specification along the lines suggested in Section 2.2. Although our
main focus is on the robustness of the fiscal fatigue proposition, we will also briefly discuss the
impact of the control variables on the primary balance.
3.1 Baseline specification
The results of estimating the baseline specification (1) suggested by Ghosh et al. (2013) using our
extended dataset are presented in column (1) of Table 2. In line with their findings, the estimated
coefficients on the debt terms imply fiscal fatigue. The marginal response of the primary balance
to lagged debt even starts to decline at somewhat lower debt levels of around 100% of GDP and
becomes negative when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 170%.
3.2 Dynamics and structure in the error terms
As the baseline specification is a static model, estimated using GLS to correct for autocorrelation
in the error terms, it does not explicitly allow for a sluggish response of the primary balance to debt
and its determinants. As a first extension we therefore transform the static model to a dynamic
one. Estimates for the dynamic specification are reported in column (2) of Table 2.3 The coefficient
on the lagged primary balance is 0.731 and highly significantly, showing considerable persistence in
2Compared to Ghosh et al. (2013), due to data availability our dataset does not include Iceland and Israel. See
Table 3 for the included countries and individual sample periods.
3When comparing the results from the static and dynamic regressions, note that in the latter the long-run effect
of each variable equals βLR =
β
1−γ .
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Table 2: Fiscal policy reaction function: homogeneous and mean-group estimation results
Dependent variable: pbit Sample period: 1970-2014, 21 countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
pbi,t−1 0.731∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.058) (0.060) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) (0.054)
di,t−1 −0.066∗∗ 0.011 −0.005 0.006 −0.065 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.181) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
d2i,t−1 1.5e-3
∗∗∗ 4.1e-4∗∗ 4.3e-4∗∗ 2.4e-4 −9.1e-4
(3.4e-4) (1.8e-4) (1.7e-4) (3.0e-4) (4.7e-3)
d3i,t−1 −5.1e-6∗∗∗ −1.8e-6∗∗∗ −1.7e-6∗∗∗ −6.5e-7 3.8e-5
(1.1e-6) (5.7e-7) (5.5e-7) (7.5e-7) (6.1e-5)
gapit 0.447
∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
gapit < 0 0.233
∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗
(0.052) (0.147)
gapit > 0 0.012 −0.081
(0.046) (0.127)
infl it 0.012 0.017 0.070
∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
iirit 0.134
∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.013 −0.015 0.021 0.030 −0.026
(0.046) (0.024) (0.026) (0.039) (0.046) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038)
curacit 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
openit 0.055
∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.011 0.007 0.022 0.008 0.004 −0.006
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Deuroit −0.323 −0.471∗∗ −0.173 −0.165 −0.440 −0.230 −0.124 0.062
(0.408) (0.234) (0.222) (0.254) (0.354) (0.255) (0.254) (0.305)
Delecit −0.184∗∗ −0.154 −0.230∗∗ −0.212∗ −0.211∗ −0.230∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.260∗∗
(0.087) (0.130) (0.122) (0.114) (0.109) (0.114) (0.114) (0.110)
Dfiscit 0.494
∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.358∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.419∗∗ 0.411∗
(0.291) (0.191) (0.205) (0.218) (0.221) (0.219) (0.218) (0.219)
oldit −0.347∗∗ −0.132 −0.045 0.147 0.266 0.134 0.116 0.139
(0.153) (0.083) (0.078) (0.108) (0.164) (0.104) (0.106) (0.112)
Foldit −0.044 −0.087∗∗ −0.025 −0.048 −0.136∗ −0.048 −0.042 −0.065
(0.093) (0.043) (0.047) (0.051) (0.080) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058)
Observations 811 809 809 809 809 809 809 809
Cross-sectional corr. 0.150 0.243 −0.048 −0.047 −0.047 −0.046 −0.046 −0.046
Time fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
CH AR(1) test χ2 414.422∗∗∗ 8.391∗∗∗ 0.028 0.064 0.153 0.051 0.131 1.294
GLS yes no no no no no no no
Hetero coefs on di,t−1 no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Wald hetero test 65.16∗∗∗ 166.24∗∗∗ 83.72∗∗∗ 81.74∗∗∗ 78.73∗∗∗
Hetero coefs on gapit no no no no no no no yes
Wald hetero test 160.20∗∗∗
Notes: The dependent variable is the primary balance pbit as a % of GDP. The GLS estimator corrects for an AR(1) autocorrelation structure and cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity in the error terms. When GLS is not used, we report White robust standard errors for the homogeneous coefficients. For the
heterogeneous coefficients we report (in bold) mean group estimates as defined in equation (4) with standard errors calculated using equation (5). Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated using ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
The output gap is instrumented by using its first and second lag and a weighted average of foreign countries’ output gaps. The current account and implicit
interest rate are instrumented by their first and second lags.
The cross-sectional correlation coefficient is calculated as the average of the country-by-country cross-correlation in the estimated error terms. CH AR(1)
is the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) test for first-order serial correlation in the error terms. This test is robust to heteroscedasticity and applicable when the
regression has been estimated using instrumental variables. It is calculated from regressions results without applying the Prais-Winsten GLS correction,
which is only implemented when significant autocorrelation is detected. ‘Wald hetero’ tests the null hypothesis that the heterogeneous slopes are actually
homogeneous across countries. It uses a covariance matrix that is robust to heteroscedasticity.
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the formation of the government budget. Note that the test for autocorrelation in the error terms
reported in the bottom of Table 2 shows that even in the dynamic specification there is significant
autocorrelation left. Moreover, the average pairwise correlation coefficients reported in the bottom
of Table 2 show that there is cross-sectional correlation in the error terms of specifications (1) and
(2). To allow and correct for common shocks hitting all countries in the panel, in specification (3)
we therefore add time-fixed effects to the model. Looking at the pairwise correlation coefficient, this
reduces the cross-sectional correlation in the error terms to a negligibly small number. Interestingly,
it also removes the autocorrelation in the error terms, suggesting that this was induced by persistence
in shocks common to all countries. The estimated time-fixed effects plotted in Figure 1 indeed show
considerable persistence (the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.69). The two deep dips that
can be observed coincide with the first oil crisis in the mid 1970s and the recent financial crisis.
Figure 1: Evolution in the time-fixed effects
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Note: Based on the column (3) in Table 2 with 1972 as the reference year.
3.3 Fiscal fatigue versus slope heterogeneity
We further extend the specification by allowing the coefficient on lagged debt di,t−1 to vary across
countries. Using the heterogeneous coefficients β̂i we calculate Mean Group (MG) estimates
β̂MG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
β̂i, (4)
with standard errors calculated in a non-parametric way (see Pesaran, 2006, equation (58) for the
asymptotic covariance matrix) as
se
(
β̂MG
)
=
√√√√( 1
(N − 1)N
N∑
i=1
(β̂i − β̂MG)(β̂i − β̂MG)
)
. (5)
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Results are reported in column (4) of Table 2. First, although the MG estimate for the reaction
of the primary balance to lagged debt of 0.006 is not significant, cross-country heterogeneity is
highly significant (Wald test statistic = 65.16; p = 0.00). Moreover, it also renders the homoge-
neous coefficients on the non-linear debt terms d2i,t−1 and d
3
i,t−1 individually insignificant, which is
confirmed by a joint significance test (Wald test statistic = 0.79; p= 0.67). In column (5), we fur-
ther allow for heterogeneous coefficients on the quadratic and cubic debt terms. Despite significant
heterogeneity, as indicated by the Wald test, non of the MG estimates is significant. The hetero-
geneous coefficients reported in Table 3 below imply that only Denmark, Portugal and Japan show
significant fiscal fatigue. For Denmark and Portugal this is due to β3 being significantly smaller
than zero. The coefficient estimates imply that the marginal response of the primary balance to
lagged debt becomes negative at debt levels of around 70% and 100% of GDP, respectively, in these
countries. Japan is a special case as we obtain β2 < 0 and β3 > 0 sch that the primary balance will
ultimately show an increasingly positive response as debt becomes sufficiently high. However, the
coefficient estimates imply that this response only becomes positive when the debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds 260%. Over the historically relevant range of debt-to-GDP ratios up to 250%, Japan shows
very strong fiscal fatigue. Note that also in Austria, Canada and the UK we obtain significant
β2 < 0 and β3 > 0, but the specific coefficient values do not imply any relevant fiscal fatigue in
these countries.
Taking stock, only a few countries show signs of fiscal fatigue and this non-linear feature of the
FRF is not clearly linked to the level of debt as some highly indebted countries (like Belgium and
Italy) seem to have a linear FRF while Denmark has a cubic FRF despite its low debt level. All of
this suggests that the response to debt is heterogeneous over countries and that the general finding
of fiscal fatigue is an artifact of imposing homogeneity. This is further confirmed by column (6)
of Table 2 where we report regression results for removing d2i,t−1 and d
3
i,t−1 from the model. The
heterogeneity is still significant (Wald test statistic = 83.72; p= 0.00) with the average reaction to
lagged debt now being positive and highly significant. The estimates of the heterogeneous reactions
reported in Table 3 reveal that most countries show a positive response to lagged debt, with Japan
being the only country with a significantly negative reaction. The countries with the biggest positive
response are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Interestingly, except for Norway
and Sweden, these are also the countries with a very high debt rate, close to or even strongly
exceeding 100% of GDP at the end of the sample and, hence, in the range where fiscal fatigue
may be observed. Moreover, out of the five other countries with a significantly positive reaction,
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four (Belgium, Canada, Spain and the UK) also have a relatively high debt rate (between 70% and
100% at the end of the sample). These results suggest that the fiscal fatigue result obtained in
the homogeneous specifications is largely due to the highest indebted country, Japan, showing the
worst reaction to lagged debt and not a general feature shared by other highly indebted countries
in our sample.4
4Note that over the post-global financial crisis period several eurozone countries (e.g. Ireland, Greece, and Portugal)
experienced a sovereign debt crisis and had to rely on EU-IMF program financing that required tightening of fiscal
policies and a reduction in fiscal deficits. This may explain their strong positive reaction to debt. Similarly, the positive
responsiveness in Belgium and Italy likely reflects the massive fiscal adjustment that these countries undertook in
the mid to late 1990s to meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria of budgets deficits no greater than 3% of GDP. While
one may argue that these are not ‘normal’ times, it nevertheless shows that there are mechanisms that prevent fiscal
fatigue to be a general characteristic of the FRFs of the countries in our sample.
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Table 3: Fiscal policy reaction function: heterogeneous coefficient estimates
Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6)
αi di,t−1 αi di,t−1 d2i,t−1 d
3
i,t−1 Wald αi di,t−1
Australia −3.001 0.034 −12.199 1.490 −0.074 0.001 4.16 −3.188 0.049
(1970-2014) (2.044) (0.040) (9.610) (1.243) (0.061) (0.001) (2.018) (0.038)
Austria −2.145 −0.027 −8.549 0.504∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 1.2e-4∗∗∗ 13.77∗∗∗ −2.323 −0.007
(1971-2013) (2.247) (0.024) (5.279) (0.211) (0.005) (4.0e-5) (2.203) (0.013)
Belgium −4.122 −0.007 21.872 −0.901 0.010 −3.2e-5 1.32 −5.112∗∗ 0.022∗
(1975-2014) (2.695) (0.045) (26.618) (0.832) (0.009) (3.0e-5) (2.529) (0.012)
Canada −2.232 0.003 −23.082 1.038∗ −0.016∗ 8.2e-5∗∗ 13.78∗∗∗ −2.970∗ 0.023∗∗
(1970-2014) (1.873) (0.038) (22.648) (0.610) (0.009) (4.0e-5) (1.718) (0.011)
Denmark −3.497 0.015 −0.625 −0.350∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −6.3e-5∗∗∗ 14.77∗∗∗ −3.718∗ 0.034∗∗
(1975-2012) (2.253) (0.029) (3.296) (0.114) (0.003) (2.0e-5) (2.221) (0.014)
Finland −1.244 −0.034 0.268 −0.264 0.007 −5.8e-5 10.23∗∗ −1.278 −0.018
(1970-2014) (1.952) (0.021) (2.664) (0.170) (0.006) (5.7e-5) (1.902) (0.014)
France −3.179 −0.010 −0.665 −0.195∗ 0.003 −8.6e-6 30.26∗∗∗ −3.326∗ 0.009
(1973-2014) (2.035) (0.024) (3.442) (0.111) (0.002) (1.3e-5) (1.979) (0.008)
Germany −2.961 −0.014 −6.835 0.293 −0.008 5.7e-5∗ 6.56∗ −3.209 0.008
(1992-2013) (2.216) (0.030) (5.340) (0.244) (0.005) (3.2e-5) (2.162) (0.011)
Greece −7.515∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.337 −0.318 0.004 −1.5e-5 27.17∗∗∗ −8.246∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(1995-2013) (2.372) (0.036) (6.358) (0.248) (0.003) (9.8e-6) (2.260) (0.017)
Ireland −5.956∗∗∗ 0.030 10.221∗ −0.873 0.013 −5.2e-5 10.62∗∗ −6.383∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(1990-2013) (2.209) (0.037) (5.266) (0.625) (0.009) (3.9e-5) (2.159) (0.018)
Italy −6.770∗∗∗ 0.021 1.748 −0.276 0.003 −8.6e-6 22.99∗∗∗ −7.590∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(1970-2014) (2.245) (0.043) (12.818) (0.292) (0.004) (1.3e-5) (2.084) (0.011)
Japan −0.621 −0.042 −2.257 0.057∗ −8.7e-4∗∗∗ 2.4e-6∗∗∗ 10.54∗∗ −1.124 −0.016∗∗
(1970-2013) (1.832) (0.041) (2.043) (0.035) (3.2e-4) (8.7e-7) (1.761) (0.007)
Korea −1.736 0.028 0.463 −0.394 0.019 −2.4e-4 3.27 −1.762 0.037
(2001-2014) (1.215) (0.034) (4.287) (0.478) (0.025) (4.0e-4) (1.176) (0.035)
Netherlands −2.151 −0.027 25.713 −1.411 0.021 −1.0e-4 7.86∗∗ −2.643 −0.002
(1970-2014) (2.177) (0.037) (31.543) (1.063) (0.019) (1.1e-4) (2.111) (0.021)
New Zealand −0.990 −0.031 1.218 −0.229 0.005 −3.2e-5 3.44 −1.385 −0.011
(1972-2013) (1.956) (0.032) (6.173) (0.386) (0.010) (7.4e-5) (1.908) (0.019)
Norway −3.489 0.060 2.861 −0.523 0.014 −1.1e-4 10.25∗∗ −3.584 0.078∗∗
(1975-2014) (2.506) (0.040) (22.543) (1.607) (0.038) (2.9e-4) (2.452) (0.034)
Portugal −4.975∗∗ 0.020 4.657 −0.573∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −4.6e-5∗∗∗ 22.62∗∗∗ −5.613∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(1975-2014) (2.136) (0.034) (4.787) (0.220) (0.004) (1.7e-5) (2.044) (0.013)
Spain −3.842∗∗ 0.014 −4.878∗ 0.085 −0.002 1.8e-5 11.16∗∗ −3.980∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(1975-2014) (1.935) (0.022) (2.649) (0.099) (0.002) (1.5e-5) (1.881) (0.010)
Sweden −6.657∗∗∗ 0.053∗ −0.820 −0.487 0.013 −8.9e-5 21.24∗∗∗ −6.925∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(1975-2011) (2.412) (0.030) (7.774) (0.406) (0.009) (6.6e-5) (2.367) (0.014)
United Kingdom −5.101∗∗ 0.018 −49.054∗∗ 2.259∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ 2.0e-4∗∗∗ 29.50∗∗∗ −5.337∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(1970-2014) (2.326) (0.027) (21.245) (0.815) (0.014) (7.8e-5) (2.253) (0.017)
United States −2.542 −0.011 4.620 −0.307 0.004 −1.3e-5 7.03∗ −2.975 0.011
(1970-2013) (2.004) (0.030) (17.156) (0.534) (0.008) (3.6e-5) (1.892) (0.013)
Notes: Specifications (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) refer to the respective columns in Table 2 in the main paper. The Wald test is for the joint significance of the
three debt terms. White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated using ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
respectively. See Table 2 for further notes.
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Table 3: Fiscal policy reaction function: heterogeneous coefficient estimates (cont.)
Specification (7) Specification (8)
di,t−1 Fixed effect di,t−1 gapit < 0 gapit > 0 Fixed effect
Australia 0.043 −2.655 0.041 0.056 −0.755 −1.439
(1970-2014) (0.038) (2.039) (0.037) (0.229) (0.424) (2.227)
Austria −0.007 −1.794 0.004 −0.197 0.654∗∗ −1.882
(1971-2013) (0.013) (2.223) (0.016) (0.259) (0.257) (2.605)
Belgium 0.022∗ −4.357∗ 0.026 −0.293 0.311 −3.548
(1975-2014) (0.012) (2.557) (0.017) (0.512) (0.363) (3.207)
Canada 0.022∗ −2.204 0.017 0.589∗∗∗ −0.185 −0.021
(1970-2014) (0.011) (1.773) (0.013) (0.109) (0.142) (2.472)
Denmark 0.025 −2.536 0.022 1.039∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.451
(1975-2012) (0.015) (2.327) (0.022) (0.291) (0.111) (3.129)
Finland −0.018 −0.637 −0.009 0.374∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.055
(1975-2014) (0.014) (1.932) (0.014) (0.094) (0.087) (2.151)
France 0.009 −2.909 0.009 −0.202 0.332 −2.612
(1973-2014) (0.008) (1.992) (0.010) (0.209) (0.233) (2.278)
Germany 0.008 −2.688 0.025∗ −0.293∗ 0.637∗∗ −3.464
(1992-2013) (0.011) (2.182) (0.014) (0.170) (0.323) (2.470)
Greece 0.065∗∗∗ −8.111∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.160 −0.184∗ −7.412∗∗∗
(1995-2013) (0.017) (2.262) (0.018) (0.308) (0.103) (2.566)
Ireland 0.052∗∗∗ −5.251∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 2.491∗∗ 0.332 −9.921∗∗∗
(1990-2013) (0.018) (2.235) (0.092) (1.107) (0.331) (2.875)
Italy 0.051∗∗∗ −7.240∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ −0.042 −0.067 −6.202∗∗∗
(1970-2014) (0.011) (2.089) (0.011) (0.140) (0.142) (2.413)
Japan −0.015∗∗ −0.772 −0.013 −0.408∗∗ 0.580∗ −1.584
(1970-2013) (0.007) (1.770) (0.008) (0.198) (0.338) (2.162)
Korea 0.031 −1.197 0.066∗ 0.140 −0.828∗∗∗ −0.177
(2001-2014) (0.034) (1.213) (0.039) (0.222) (0.312) (1.569)
Netherlands −0.001 −2.132 −0.001 0.081 0.021 −0.579
(1970-2014) (0.020) (2.127) (0.024) (0.215) (0.236) (2.710)
New Zealand −0.010 −0.809 0.008 1.083∗ −1.652∗∗∗ 1.114
(1972-2013) (0.019) (1.933) (0.024) (0.556) (0.596) (2.167)
Norway 0.069∗∗ −2.722 0.060 0.720 −0.584∗∗ −0.516
(1975-2014) (0.033) (2.498) (0.038) (0.442) (0.268) (2.874)
Portugal 0.047∗∗∗ −4.899∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.044 −4.776∗∗
(1975-2014) (0.013) (2.076) (0.016) (0.173) (0.179) (2.366)
Spain 0.030∗∗∗ −3.241 0.041∗∗∗ 0.184∗ −0.155 −3.115
(1975-2014) (0.010) (1.924) (0.012) (0.102) (0.339) (2.207)
Sweden 0.068∗∗∗ −5.966∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.160 −4.471
(1975-2011) (0.014) (2.443) (0.017) (0.160) (0.189) (3.114)
United Kingdom 0.037∗∗ −4.748∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ −0.905∗∗∗ −3.367
(1970-2014) (0.017) (2.283) (0.019) (0.264) (0.194) (2.613)
United States 0.012 −2.540 0.027∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ −3.285
(1970-2013) (0.013) (1.920) (0.013) (0.083) (0.101) (2.205)
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3.4 Heterogeneity and asymmetry in response to business cycle fluctuations
Finally, we test whether there is cross-country heterogeneity and asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal
policy towards business cycle fluctuations. To this end regression (7) in Table 2 allows the reaction of
the primary balance to the output gap to be different when the economy is in an upturn (gapit > 0)
or in a downturn (gapit < 0). The results confirm the findings of Balassone et al. (2010) and E´gert
(2012) that fiscal balances tend to deteriorate in contractions without correspondingly improving
in expansions. This difference is found to be statistically significant (Wald test statistic = 11.38;
p=0.00). Regression (8) further allows the reaction to the business cycle to be heterogeneous across
countries.5 The asymmetric counter-cyclical reaction to the business cycle shows up significantly in
ten of the individual country estimates, most pronounced in Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and
the UK. Eight countries show a more symmetric (or no) reaction to the business cycle, while in
three countries (Austria, Germany and Japan) the primary balance improves more in expansions
than it deteriorates during recessions.
3.5 The effect of control variables
Inflation, as measured by the GDP-deflator, always has a positive impact on the primary balance and
is significant most of the time. The most common explanation given in the literature is the bracket
creep effect (see e.g. Saez, 2003), referring to the phenomenon that in a progressive tax system
government revenues will rise faster than inflation when there is no automatic indexation of the tax
brackets. An increase in seigniorage revenues is an alternative but less likely explanation, given that
the (change in the) amount of central bank profits is quite limited. A higher implicit interest rate
on debt should urge governments to improve their primary balance in order to offset the negative
effect on the overall balance. The coefficient on the implicit interest rate is indeed positive, but
only significant in the fully homogeneous specifications (1)-(3). Each regression further confirms the
twin-deficit hypothesis by showing a positive and significant coefficient. Trade openness is included
to control for the possibility that countries that are more sensitive to unforeseen international
economic shocks may follow a more prudent fiscal policy as a buffer against these shocks. Although
the coefficient is always positive, it is only significant in regressions (1)-(2).
The euro area dummy should capture the potential difference in fiscal policy after a country lost
control of its monetary policy. The results show that euro area membership does not significantly
affect the primary balance. The election year dummy shows up with a negative coefficient and
5This heterogeneity is found to be significant (Wald test statistic = 160.20; p = 0.00).
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is significant in the majority of models. This supports the electoral business cycle hypothesis
(see e.g. Alesina et al., 1993) that governments tend to realize a larger deficit/lower surplus in
election years. The idea is that ruling politicians make use of their power position to manipulate
the current economic situation with more spending in order to increase their chance of reelection.
The implementation of a fiscal rule, in contrast, has a significantly positive impact on the primary
balance in all of the regressions reported in Table 2.
Turning to the ratio of elderly, we expect that a higher ratio of old people has a negative impact
on the primary balance due to higher social security expenditures while a higher ratio of future old
people, in contrast, should stimulate forward-looking governments to improve the current primary
balances in order to buffer for future age-related costs. However, this is not confirmed by the data.
The expected negative effect of the current ratio of elderly is present in the first 3 regressions but is
only significant in the first. The future ratio of elderly even has an unexpected negative (although
mostly insignificant) impact.
4 Debt sustainability analysis
In this section we look into debt sustainability analysis. Next to Bohn (1998)’s original sustainability
test, we present stochastic debt simulations to illustrate the sensitivity of future debt trajectories
to the specification of the FRF. These simulations are to a large extent explorative and should
therefore not be taken as full-fledged predictions of future debt evolutions.
4.1 Sustainability tests based on the FRF estimates
Bohn (1998)’s original sustainability test checks whether a rise in a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio
elicits an increase in its primary balance. In practice, this comes down to estimating the coefficient
on di,t−1 in a linear but heterogeneous FRF. Table 3 reports the country-specific coefficient estimates
for the various specifications in Table 2. Focusing on the most general specification (8), fiscal policy
is sustainable in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the
US as these countries show a significantly positive response of the primary balance to the lagged
debt-to-GDP ratio.
Although a positive reaction of the primary balance to lagged debt is a sufficient condition for
the government to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, it does not rule out a further increase
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in the debt-to-GDP ratio. This can be seen by looking at a standard debt dynamics equation
∆dit =
rit − git
1 + git
di,t−1 − pbit ≈ (rit − git) di,t−1 − pbit, (6)
where rit is the real interest rateand git is the growth rate of real GDP. Equation (6) shows that
the debt-to-GDP ratio will increase when the reaction of the primary balance to lagged debt is
smaller than the interest-growth rate differential. Hence Bohn’s condition does not exclude an ever
increasing debt-to-GDP ratio and is therefore labeled a weak sustainability criterion.
Ghosh et al. (2013) adopt the stricter sustainability criterion that government debt should
converge to some finite proportion of GDP. When the FRF is linear in the lagged government
debt-to-GDP ratio, this condition is met when the reaction of the primary balance is greater than
the interest-growth rate differential. Ghosh et al. (2013) further argue that due to fiscal fatigue
the responsiveness of the primary balance will fall below the interest-growth rate differential as
debt rises, resulting in a debt limit beyond which fiscal policy is unsustainable. A country’s fiscal
space can then be defined as the difference between this debt limit and the actually observed debt
level. Although fiscal space is an attractive and intuitive way to evaluate debt sustainability, we
will not use it as we have shown that fiscal fatigue is a characteristic of FRFs that disappears once
a heterogeneous response to lagged debt is allowed for.
4.2 Stochastic debt simulations
The above sustainability criteria do not take into account the uncertainties surrounding debt dynam-
ics induced by macroeconomic shocks. In this section we therefore present results from stochastic
debt simulations. By simulating macroeconomic shocks and feeding them into the FRF and dy-
namic debt equation, we are able to simulate future debt paths. Note that these simulations are only
included here to demonstrate the effect of alternative specifications of the FRF and the uncertainty
surrounding future debt trajectories. For this purpose, we deliberately adopt a rather simple simu-
lation algorithm based on Celasun et al. (2007) and Medeiros (2012). This raises the comparability
with existing simulations but also means that we inherit their drawbacks. For example, there is no
channel in which fiscal policy influences the economy, we do not make projections for the future
evolution of the control variables, future shocks may be different from past shocks, fiscal policy may
change over time, etc. Hence, our simulation results should not be taken as full-fledged predictions
of debt evolutions. More elaborate simulations are left for future research.
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Stochastic debt simulations start from the dynamic debt equation (6) to construct future debt-
to-GDP ratios di,t+τ , with τ indicating the forecasting horizon, complemented with (i) a VAR model
to generate future economic shocks and (ii) a fiscal reaction function to model the response of the
primary balance pbi,t+τ to the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and economic shocks as generated by the
VAR.
More specifically, we first estimate country-specific unrestricted quarterly VAR models using
data including the (unweighted) average of the long and short term real interest rate, real GDP
growth and inflation (see Table 6 in Appendix A for data sources). The latter was added to separate
the different feedback channels of the shocks (see Burger et al., 2012). We select the maximum lag
order of each VAR in a similar fashion as Medeiros (2012). This means that the Schwarz information
criterion is used for sample sizes lower than 120 observations and the Hannan-Quinn criterion for
the countries with a longer sample. The estimated VAR model is then used to construct future
interest rate, growth and inflation trajectories by generating innovations to each of these variables
and feeding them through the VAR dynamics. As the Jarque-Bera test rejected the null hypothesis
that the VAR error terms are normally distributed for each country and variable, these innovations
are not taken from a normal distribution but obtained by randomly drawing (with replacement)
from the estimated reduced form VAR error terms. The cross-correlation structure is maintained
by jointly sampling from the reduced form error terms in each period.
Second, the FRF estimates from Section 3 are used to infer the reaction of the primary balance.
We will use the estimation results from 5 different FRFs reported in Table 2, corresponding to the
fiscal fatigue and dynamic fiscal fatigue specifications in columns (1) and (2), the heterogeneous
linear model in column (6) and the heterogeneous linear models with asymmetric response to the
output gap in column (7) and (8). Besides lagged debt, FRFs typically include a list of control
variables. The evolution of inflation and the output gap are simulated using the VAR model.6 For
the other control variables we don’t have predictions readily available.7 Following Celasun et al.
(2007), we therefore fix each of these control variables to stay constant at their last observed value
over the forecasting period.8 We further add country-specific shocks when simulating the primary
balance to account for uncertainty in the reaction of fiscal policy. These shocks are randomly drawn
6To obtain the output gap, we apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 1600) to the simulated real GDP growth series.
The end-period problem is avoided by extending the predicted period of GDP growth by 4 quarters.
7Note that the VAR includes market interest rates rather than the implicit interest rate on government debt as we
don’t have any quarterly data available for the latter. As a result, we have to fix the implicit interest rate over the
forecasting horizon.
8We checked the robustness of this assumption by using the average over the previous 5 years of each control
variable. This does not have a big impact on the results.
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(with replacement) from the estimated FRF error terms.
Third, given the simulated interest and growth rates and the reaction of the primary balance,
we can calculate government debt using equation (6). In order to obtain a fan chart of different
possible outcomes, we simulate 2000 debt trajectories over a five year horizon starting from the last
available observation Ti. Given the unbalancedness of the data, Ti varies over countries and hence
the forecasting horizon ranges from 2012-2016 to 2015-2019.
Fan charts of the debt trajectories for the 21 considered countries and each of the 5 alternative
FRF specifications are reported in Appendix B. As a summary of the results, Table 4 reports the
simulated five years ahead mean debt-to-GDP ratio together with the probability that it increases
over the forecasting horizon.
Table 4: Summary results stochastic debt simulations over alternative FRF specifications
E(di,Ti+5) P (di,Ti+5 > di,Ti)
(1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (6) (7) (8)
1 Australia 47.7 62.9 54.0 55.2 55.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2 Austria 51.5 65.7 79.0 78.5 79.5 0.0 8.6 98.0 97.2 95.6
3 Belgium 99.7 101.0 104.9 103.9 115.1 43.3 50.6 63.9 61.0 91.0
4 Canada 86.6 81.9 76.8 75.7 75.4 32.8 14.0 3.7 3.1 3.4
5 Denmark 40.6 30.3 30.0 27.9 24.5 19.2 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.2
6 Finland 41.6 47.9 52.9 51.7 45.8 0.0 1.2 11.1 7.5 0.4
7 France 85.0 98.8 108.0 105.1 115.5 4.3 60.9 92.1 85.8 98.9
8 Germany 73.8 82.4 82.2 82.6 80.2 12.8 66.1 66.4 68.7 52.4
9 Greece 138.0 171.7 142.5 132.4 138.7 12.3 44.6 14.3 8.2 10.9
10 Ireland 66.9 150.9 143.3 138.7 88.9 0.1 99.2 97.1 93.8 3.0
11 Italy 143.8 141.7 124.9 121.8 132.8 92.2 82.3 1.8 0.7 25.5
12 Japan 306.6 299.4 282.6 284.0 273.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.4
13 Korea 31.1 23.0 20.8 20.7 28.3 5.2 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.4
14 Netherlands 49.7 66.3 65.5 62.8 73.3 0.0 5.5 4.4 0.9 54.0
15 New Zealand 63.9 77.5 74.6 73.5 56.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.7
16 Norway 18.7 −9.5 0.2 −0.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
17 Portugal 132.2 142.4 132.6 128.4 117.6 73.6 95.9 74.3 55.5 14.2
18 Spain 92.9 123.5 116.0 111.7 114.8 22.8 100.0 99.3 95.1 98.5
19 Sweden 53.2 44.3 40.5 40.4 39.0 99.9 95.6 76.5 73.7 62.1
20 United Kingdom 87.0 121.6 117.9 118.0 111.6 30.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
21 United States 94.5 108.3 114.8 113.9 116.4 2.0 55.0 86.2 82.2 92.7
Notes: The specifications numbers (1), (2), (5), (6) and (7) refer to the respective columns in Table 2, with (1) and (2) being the fiscal
fatigue and dynamic fiscal fatigue specifications, (5) the heterogeneous linear model and (6) and (7) the heterogeneous linear models
with asymmetric response to the output gap.
E(di,Ti+5) is the mean of the simulated five years ahead debt-to-GDP ratio, while P (di,Ti+5 > di,Ti) is the simulated probability that
the debt-to-GDP ratio increases over the forecasting horizon.
Also see Table 2 for further notes.
The simulation results show that the debt trajectories are very sensitive to the specification of
the FRF. First, somewhat counter intuitively, for some of the relatively highly indebted countries
the stochastic debt simulations based on the fiscal fatigue specifications (1) and (2) generate more
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favorable outcomes than the other 3 FRFs. This is due to the fact that our coefficient estimates
of the fiscal fatigue specification imply that the response of the primary balance is at its maximum
when the debt-to-GDP ratio is around 100%. As a result, in Belgium, France and the US the
response based on the fiscal fatigue specifications (1)-(2) is more favorable than the heterogeneous
response in the linear specifications (6)-(8). Although Canada, Ireland, Italy and Portugal also have
debt-to-GDP levels in the proximity of 100%, their heterogeneous reaction in specifications (6)-(8)
implies an even more favorable response. When debt is very high, as in Greece and Japan, fiscal
fatigue sets in implying a less favorable response.
Second, the asymmetric response towards the output gap in specification (7), with the primary
balance deteriorating in bad times but not improving in good times, should in principle imply less
favorable debt trajectories. Overall, this doesn’t show up in the simulation results, though. This
is due to the fact that when going from specification (6) to (7) the fixed effect improve for all
countries, while some countries also show a stronger reaction to lagged debt (e.g. Greece), both of
which leading to more favorable debt trajectories and hence counterbalancing the negative impact
of the asymmetric response towards the output gap. A similar outcome can be observed when
allowing for a heterogeneous asymmetric response to the output gap, i.e. going from specification
(7) to (8). Ireland, for instance, shows a very strong counter-cyclical reaction during downturns
but its reaction to lagged debt is much stronger implying a much more favorable debt trajectory
under specification (8). The same holds for New Zealand and the United Kingdom, where next to
a somewhat stronger reaction to lagged debt also the fixed effect improves considerably.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated whether fiscal fatigue is a robust characteristic of the fiscal reaction
function in a panel of OECD countries over the period 1970-2014 or merely an artifact of ignoring
important aspects of the panel dimension of the data. We find that the quadratic and cubic debt-
to-GDP terms that imply fiscal fatigue become insignificant once a heterogeneous reaction to lagged
debt is allowed for. The results further show that the primary balance deteriorates in bad times
but is largely unresponsive in good times. Explorative stochastic debt simulations show that debt
forecasts crucially depend on the specification of the fiscal reaction function.
Our main finding that fiscal fatigue is not an ubiquitous feature of the fiscal reaction function, at
least not over the debt levels observed in our sample, implies that the nowadays popular fiscal space
concept, calculated at many national and international policy institutions, may be an erroneous
debt sustainability measure. To gain further insight in the sustainability of fiscal policy, further
research should look into the determinants of the heterogeneous response. Also the role played by
other type of non-linearities like fiscal plans and consolidation periods is worth investigating.
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A Data sources
Table 5: Variables used in the FRF regressions (21 countries, 1970-2014, yearly data)
Variable Description Source
Primary Balance Primary balance as % of GDP Data up to 2011 based on Mauro et al. (2015) from which we
selected the relevant countries and updated these with more
recent data (2012-2014) using the OECD Economic Outlook
database
Debt Gross public debt as % of GDP Data up to 2011 based on Mauro et al. (2015) from which
we selected the relevant countries and updated these with
more recent data (2012-2014) using the IMF World Eco-
nomic Outlook database
Output Gap Output gap in % of potential GDP IMF World Economic Outlook database
Inflation Growth rate GDP deflator (in %) World Bank and OECD National Accounts data
Implied interest
rate
Gross interest payments as a ratio of total gross
debt
Mauro et al. (2015)
Current account
balance
External sectors, trade and payments: Current
account balance, as a % of GDP
OECD Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments Statistic for Greece)
Trade Openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices, as a % of GDP
World bank, World Development indicators
Euro area Dummy that is 1 for countries belonging to the
Euro area, 0 otherwise
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/euro/index en.htm
Election year Dummy that is 1 when an election (legislative or
presidential) was held in a certain year, 0 other-
wise
World Bank, database of Political Institutions
Fiscal Program Dummy that is 1 if a fiscal program was in place
in a certain year, 0 otherwise
Budina et al. (2012); Bova et al. (2015); Dong-won et al.
(2011) and Shyn (2013) for Korea
(Future) old Percentage of the total population older than 60,
current or in 20 years
United Nations, Population by age, sex and urban/rural res-
idence
Table 6: Variables used in the VAR estimation (21 countries, 1970-2014, quarterly data)
Variable Description Source
Real GDP growth Year-on-year growth in real GDP, seasonally ad-
justed
OECD, National Accounts (quarterly)
Real interest rate Unweighted average of short- and long-term real
interest rates, % per annum
OECD, Monetary and Financial Statistics (monthly)
Inflation Year-on-year growth in the consumer prices in-
dex (all items)
OECD, Main Economic Indicators (quarterly)
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B Country-specific simulated debt trajectories
Figure 2: Results stochastic debt simulations for Australia
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Note: Different colors present deciles in the distributions of debt ratios, with the zone in dark blue representing a 50 percent confidence interval
around the median projection and the full colored area a confidence interval of 80 percent.
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Figure 3: Results stochastic debt simulations for Austria
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Figure 4: Results stochastic debt simulations for Belgium
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Figure 5: Results stochastic debt simulations for Canada
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Figure 6: Results stochastic debt simulations for Denmark
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Figure 7: Results stochastic debt simulations for Finland
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
30
40
50
60
70
(1) Fiscal fatigue
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
41.55
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
30
40
50
60
70
(2) Dynamic fiscal fatigue
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
47.93
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
30
40
50
60
70
(5) Heterogeneous model
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
52.86
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
30
40
50
60
70
(6) Asymmetric output gap
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
51.73
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
30
40
50
60
70
(7) Heterogeneous asymmetric output gap
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
45.8
7
(8)
(6)
Note: see Figure 2.
31
Figure 8: Results stochastic debt simulations for France
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Figure 9: Results stochastic debt simulations for Germany
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Figure 10: Results stochastic debt simulations for Greece
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Figure 11: Results stochastic debt simulations for Ireland
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Figure 12: Results stochastic debt simulations for Italy
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Figure 13: Results stochastic debt simulations for Japan
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Figure 14: Results stochastic debt simulations for Korea
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Figure 15: Results stochastic debt simulations for Netherlands
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Figure 16: Results stochastic debt simulations for New Zealand
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
(1) Fiscal fatigue
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
63.92
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
(2) Dynamic fiscal fatigue
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio 77.52
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
(5) Heterogeneous model
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio 74.55
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
(6) Asymmetric output gap
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio 73.53
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
(7) Heterogeneous asymmetric output gap
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
56.51
7
(8)
(6)
Note: see Figure 2.
40
Figure 17: Results stochastic debt simulations for Norway
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Figure 18: Results stochastic debt simulations for Portugal
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
60
80
10
0
14
0
18
0
(1) Fiscal fatigue
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
132.22
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
60
80
10
0
14
0
18
0
(2) Dynamic fiscal fatigue
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio 142.4
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
60
80
10
0
14
0
18
0
(5) Heterogeneous model
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
132.63
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
60
80
10
0
14
0
18
0
(6) Asymmetric output gap
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
128.35
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
60
80
10
0
14
0
18
0
(7) Heterogeneous asymmetric output gap
year
de
bt
−
G
DP
 ra
tio
117.61
7
(8)
(6)
Note: see Figure 2.
42
Figure 19: Results stochastic debt simulations for Spain
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Figure 20: Results stochastic debt simulations for Sweden
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Figure 21: Results stochastic debt simulations for United Kingdom
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Figure 22: Results stochastic debt simulations for United States
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